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ABSTRACT 
We study repeated prize allocation problem when the discount 
factors f the agents are not equal. It is shown that the feasible set of 
payoffs is not well behaved. In particular, it is not convex as it 
contains holes and caves. The Pareto frontier is everywhere 
discontinuous and there is an open subset of discount factors such 
that the feasible set is totally disconnected. 
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A handy way to model inﬁnitely repeated interaction is to assume discount-
ing. The special case of equal discount factors is well studied in the litera-
ture. Often cited and useful property of the feasible set of payoﬀsi st h a ti t
coincides with the convex hull of stage game payoﬀs. While one justiﬁcation
for this might be public randomization, the more fundamental one relies on
the repeated structure itself. Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) and Sorin (1986)
demonstrate that any convex combination of stage game payoﬀsc a nb ei n -
duced by alternating pure actions with the appropriate frequencies. This
result constitutes a building block of the folk theorem by Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986, 1990): Any individually rational feasible payoﬀ conﬁguration
can be implemented in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, even without
public randomizing device.
Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) show that, when discount factors diﬀer and
when players have access to a public randomizing device,t h es e to ff e a s i b l e
payoﬀs is larger than the convex hull of stage game payoﬀs.1 They also
assert that public randomization is without loss of generality - as it is under
equal discount factors. We demonstrate that this assertation is not true.
The aim of this note is to problematize the unequal discount factors
case. We allocate a ﬁxed prize inﬁnitely many times between a patient and
an impatient player, and abstract from strategic issues.
The feasible set of payoﬀsi sd i ﬃcult to characterize. As after any ﬁnite
history the continuation feasible set is a discounted version of the period zero
feasible set, there is no ﬁnitary method that determines all coordinates of the
feasible set, as opposed to the case of equal discount factors (cf. Fudenberg
and Maskin, 1991).2 M o r e o v e r ,w es h o wt h a ti nal a r g ec l a s so fd i s c o u n t
factors the feasible set is totally disconnected. Whether this holds for all
games under unequal discount factors remains an open question.
Pareto-optimality is the key criterion of successive collective decision
making. However, with any unequal discount factors the Pareto frontier of
t h ef e a s i b l es e ti snowhere continuous. It is not clear how one should bargain
over set with nowhere continuous Pareto frontier.
We assert that our results extend to a general class of repeated games.
Some simulations concerning the feasible set in other repeated games are
provided in the ﬁnal section.
1The reason for this is that players’ trade-oﬀ between consuming today versus later
diﬀer when their discount factors diﬀer. Hence there may exist mutually beneﬁcial ”payoﬀ
trades”.
2The feasible set of a repeated game is a fractal whose self-similar components happen
to overlap.
12T h e s e t u p
There is an inﬁnite sequence of indivisible prizes of consumption value unity,
to be allocated either to player P (patient) or I (impatient). The discount
factors of the two players are δP and δI, respectively, with 1 >δ P >δ I > 0.
Denote by sk ∈ {0,1} the stage k allocation with sk =1if the prize goes to
P and 0 otherwise. A stream is denoted by s =( s0,s 1,...),a n dt h es e to f
streams by S = {0,1}∞.
Normalized payoﬀ from stream s to P and I are










Denote the value of s at period t by u(s : t).T h a ti s ,










For any A ⊆ S,d e n o t eu[A]={(uP(s),u I(s)) : s ∈ A},a n dt h e
i−projection of u[A] by ui[A],f o ri = I,P. By our normalization, u[S] ⊂
[0,1]2. Denote the set of Pareto-optimal sequences by
PO=
©
s : ui(s0) >u i(s) ⇒ uj(s0) <u j(s), for all s0 ∈ S
ª
.
The P-a n dI-maximal payoﬀs are generated by streams 1 =( 1 ,1,....)
and 0 =( 0 ,0,....), respectively. Denote by by 1t =( 0 ,...,0 | {z }
t−1
,1,0,0,...) the
sequence that gives P only the t’th prize. Use notation s−s0 =( s0−s0
0,s 1−
s0
1,...) if st −s0
t ∈ {0,1} for all t.T h e n1−s gives the prize in period t to P
if and only if s gives it to I. Moreover, s±1t is the stream that diﬀers from
s only in that it changes the allocation of t’th prize in s.
2.1 Characterization
The set S = {0,1}∞ is a compact metric space (“the Cantor space”). Hence
the function u : S → [0,1]2, for u(s)=( uI(s),u P(s)), is a continuous
function on a compact metric space and, consequently, u[S] is a compact
subset of [0,1]2.
Proposition 1 Let δP < 1/2.T h e nS = PO.
2Proof. F i r s tw ec l a i mt h a ts0 6= s implies uP(s) 6= uP(s0) and uI(s) 6= uI(s0).
Let t be the least index such that st 6= s0
t, and, without loss of generality,
st =1 , s0
t =0 .I f , s a y , uP(s)=uP(s0),t h e na l s ouP(s : t)=uP(s0 : t).
In the extreme case, st0 =0and s0
t0 =1for all t0 = t +1 ,t+2 ,..., i.e.
uP(s : t) ≥ 1 − δP and uP(s0 : t) ≤ δP . But since δP < 1/2, we have
1 − δP >δ P. Thus uP(s : t) >u P(s0 : t), a contradiction.
Take any s ∈ S, and suppose that s0 ∈ S Pareto dominates s.B y t h e
previous paragraph, s0 is strictly better for both P and I than s.L e tt be the
least index such that st 6= s0
t. By the argument of the previous paragraph
st =1implies that uP(s) >u P(s0), which is not possible. Hence st =0 .
But then, by the same argument, uI(s) >u I(s0), a contradiction.
The following result is well known (e.g. Fudenberg and Maskin, 1991;
Sorin, 1986).
Lemma 2 If δi ≥ 1/2, then ui[S]=[ 0 ,1], for i = I,P.
This does not yet say much about the feasible set u[S] in [0,1]2. However,
in the special case of δP = δI the set u[PO] coincides with the interval
[(1,0),(0,1)], the convex hull of the "stage game" payoﬀs. We now argue
that this does not generalize to the δP >δ I case.
A closed subset U of an Euclidean space is connected if it cannot be
partitioned into two disjoint closed sets. The maximal connected subsets
of U are called components of U. Now U is totally disconnected if all its
components are one point sets.
The recursive structure of u[S] implies that it is self-similar.D e ﬁne
u[S : ∅]=u[S] and let, for all t =0 ,1,...,
u[S : s0,...,s t]={(x + st(1 − δP),y+( 1− st)(1 − δI)) : (x,y) ∈ u[S : s0,...,s t−1]}.
Then, for all t =0 ,1,...,
u[S : s0,...,s t−1]=∪st∈{0,1}u[S : s0,...,s t−1,s t].
Proposition 3 For any δP > 1/2 there is d such that u[S] is totally dis-
connected if δP ≥ d>δ I > 1/2.
Proof. First we show that u[S] is totally disconnected when δP >δ I =1 /2.
By the self-similarity of u[S], it suﬃces to show that u[S :0 ]and u[S :1 ]are
disjoint. Thus we need that u(1,s 1,s 2,...) 6= u(0,s 0
1,s 0




Suppose, to the contrary, that u(1,s 1,s 2,...)=u(0,s 0
1,s 0
2,...) for some
s1,s 2,... and s0
1,s 0










3Since δI =1 /2, necessarily st =0and s0
t =1for all t =1 ,2,.... But
this implies, since also uP(1,s 1,s 2,...)=uP(0,s 0
1,s 0
2,...),t h a tδP =1 /2, a
contradiction.
That the desired d>1/2 exists follows from the continuity of uI(·) in
δI.
Figure 1a below depicts a fractal that is induced by discount factors
δP =0 .7 and δI =0 .55. It is easy to see that u[S] is disconnected. By
self-similarity of the components, it is also totally disconnected. Figure 1b
depicts u[S] when δP =0 .8 and δI =0 .7. Now it is no longer clear whether
u[S] is connected or not.
[Figure 1a,b around here]
We leave open the question of when exactly is the feasible set is totally
disconnected. What is clear is that there are discount factors under which
the feasible set is connected (when the discount factors are equal and above
1/2). Whether this holds in general when the discount factors are close
and/or high is a diﬃcult question.
2.2 Pareto Frontier
We ﬁrst argue that a Pareto-optimal stream has a stage from which onwards
all prizes are given to the impatient player only if the stream gives all the
prizes to him.
Lemma 4 Let δP ≥ 1/2.I fs ∈ PO\{0},t h e ns allocates inﬁnitely many
prizes to P.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is t such that st =1and st0 =0
for all t0 >t .T h e n uI (s : t)=δI,a n duP (s : t)=1− δP. Let, without
loss of generality, t =0 . By Lemma 2, there is s0 such that s0
0 =0and
uP (s0 :1 )=( 1− δP)/δP. Since stδP ≥ (1 − st)δI, for all t =0 ,1,..., with
strict inequality when st =1 , it follows that uP (s0 :1 )>u I (1 − s0 :1 ).
Thus, since δP >δ I,w eh a v e













1 − s0 :0
¢
,
4where the ﬁnal equality follows by 1 − s0
0 =1 . By construction, δI < 1 −
uI(1 − s0 :0 )=uI(s0 :0 ) . Thus, since move from s to s0 keeps P indiﬀerent
but increases I’s payoﬀ,w eh a v es 6∈ PO.
Thus any Pareto-optimal stream (other than 0) gives the prize inﬁnitely
many times to the patient player. From this it follows that any utility level
of player P can be induced by some Pareto-optimal stream.
Proposition 5 Let δP ≥ 1/2.T h e nuP[PO]=[ 0 ,1].
Proof. Take any closed interval [x,1] ⊂ [0,1],x<1. By Lemma 2, there
is a nonempty, compact subset A of S such that uP(A)=[ x,1].S i n c e A
is compact and uI continuous, the set B =a r gm a x s∈A uI(s) is nonempty,
compact subset of A, and hence there is s∗ such that s∗ ∈ argmaxs∈B uP(s).
By construction, s∗ ∈ PO.I t s u ﬃces to show that uP(s∗)=x. Suppose
that uP(s∗)−x>0. By Lemma 4, there is big enough t such that s∗
t =1and
uP(s∗) − x>(1 − δP)δt
P.B u tt h e ns∗ − 1t ∈ A while uI(s∗ − 1t) >u I(s∗),
which contradicts the assumption that s∗ ∈ B.
By Proposition 5, there is a function f :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] whose graph
coincides with the Pareto frontier, i.e. f(uP(s)) = uI(s) for all s ∈ PO.Then
f(uP(s)) ≥ uI(s) for all s ∈ S. By construction, f is a strictly decreasing
function. Function f is nowhere continuous if there is no open interval on
which f is continuous.
Proposition 6 f is nowhere continuous.
Proof. Let, to the contrary of the proposition, there be an open interval
X ⊂ [0,1] on which f is continuous. Since f is strictly decreasing on X, the
set of points where f is not diﬀerentiable has Lebesque measure zero. Let f
be diﬀerentiable on a set D ⊂ X that has strictly positive Lebesgue measure.
Denote by S(1t) the set of sequences such that st0 =1for all t0 ≥ t. Since
∪∞
t=0S(1t) consists of countably many elements, set uP[∪∞
t=0S(1t)] has zero
measure. Thus we may assume D ⊂ uP[S\ ∪∞
t=0 S(1t)].
Take x ∈ D, and ﬁnd s ∈ PO\ ∪∞
t=0 S(1t)) such that u(s)=( x,f(x)).
By construction, there are inﬁnitely many periods t such that st =0 . Thus,
s +1 t ∈ S, for all these periods t. For any such t,
uP(s +1 t)=uP(s)+( 1− δP)δt
P,
uI(s +1 t)=uI(s) − (1 − δI)δt
I.
5Choosing {xt} = {uP(s+1 t)}, we have, by the deﬁnitions of derivative and
f,
f0(x)= l i m
t→∞
f(uP(s)) − f(uP(s +1 t))
uP(s) − uP(s +1 t)
≥ lim
t→∞
uI(s) − uI(s +1 t))












But (1) contradicts the fact that f is strictly decreasing.
However, f also possesses some continuity properties.
Proposition 7 Let δI ≥ 1/2. Then f is left-continuous.
Proof. Let {xn} be an increasing sequence on [0,1] converging to x.T h e n
{f(xn)} is a decreasing sequence bounded below by 0. Hence {f(xn)} con-
verges to y.S i n c eu[S] is compact, (x,y) is in u[S] by deﬁnition of f.S i n c e
(xn,f(xn)) is a Pareto optimal utility allocation for each n,w ec a n n o th a v e
f(x) >y .S o f(x) ≤ y, and since (x,y) is in u[S],w eh a v ef(x)=y,b y
deﬁnition of f.
We conclude from Proposition 4 that it is nonproblematic for the patient
agent to ﬁnd his personal maximal subject to impatient agent’s reservation
payoﬀ. However, by Proposition 6, this is not the case for the impatient
agent: his maximal payoﬀ is very sensitive to the patient agent’s payoﬀ,a n d
hence ﬁnding it is computationally very hard.
3 Discussion
This paper studies the consequences of diﬀerentiated discount factors on
players’ payoﬀs from prize streams. To see how diﬀerentiated discount fac-





As demonstrated by Lehrer and Pauzner (1999), the induced feasible set
under randomization has a smooth boundary, and contains the convex hull
of stage game payoﬀs as a proper subset. However, without randomization
the feasible set of prisoners’ dilemma is a proper subset of the feasible set
with randomization. The boundary is everywhere non-smooth and contains
6caves. Fig. 2 depicts the feasible set under δP =0 .9 and δI =0 .7.O u r
results still apply: the Pareto-frontier is is everywhere discontinuous. The
shape of the feasible set is sensitive to the size of the discount factors.
[Figure 2 around here]
These observations have some relevance from the viewpoint of the Folk
theorem. For example, the equilibria in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986, 1990)
rely on the assumption that continuation payoﬀs can be matched with in-
centives not to deviate. When mixed strategies are used, exact match of
continuation payoﬀs may be important. The problem is that when discount
factors are unequal, the feasibe set is far from convex, and it is no longer
clear (to us) that one can always ﬁnd the needed continuation payoﬀs.
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